Rationality
The bioethicists insist on making purely rational comparisons and distinctions. On the basis of an unexamined notion of 'rationality' they naturally seek whatever lends itself to a rational approach, ignoring all else. It is, then, no surprise that many speak as though the essential problem lies in the gradualness of the process of development; so the moral status of the fetus (baby?) is rather like ascertaining when someone is bald. 'Abortion poses a difficult ethical issue because the development of the human being is a gradual process' (Singer, p. The quixotic method in philosophy Our scientific technological society has set us up to accept something we call a 'rational' approach, and 'bioethics' is constructed on this basis. A method emerges, which holds out hope of solutions to our deepest moral perplexity. The method, in rough outline, looks something like this.
1)
We need to establish a rule for distinguishing between right and wrong actions (e.g. regarding abortion, euthanasia, neonatal care, embryo research). 2) We suppose that this requires an answer to a prior question about 'moral status' (e.g. of the fetus/embryo, terminally ill patient, handicapped newborn). 3) We take a proposal for some plausible criterion for answering the status question (e.g. individuality, personhood, human form, consciousness). 4) We decide on, and defend, the most plausible criterion. 5) Someone else then applies the criterion in some analogous (often fantastic) case, where it has absurd results (e.g. a chimpanzee is more of a person than a newborn baby). 6) We either defend the criterion, arguing that the absurdity is not so absurd after all (chimpanzees really are people) or that the analogy is false, or move on to a different criterion. 7) The new criterion runs up against the same difficulties as the previous one; it must do because what is misconceived is the very idea of a rationally decisive criterion. This method does have the advantage that it can keep bioethicists engaged in refined debate and academic paper-writing indefinitely. If bioethics were an a-rt form and an end in itself, this might be perfectly acceptable. Sculpture, for example, does not seek solutions. 
G Huint
Those who focus on this point often argue that the conceptus is a 'potential person'. This is presented as a matter for rational acceptance. However, it has been objected that a potential person is not a person ('potential' is not an adjective like 'big' or 'fat') and that it is far from certain that any zygote will become an adult human being. It has also been said that it is confusing to think that everything that goes into a person is present in nuce in a couple of fused chromosomes.
Scrutiny of the zygote reveals no signs of personhood. Perhaps the objections are missing the point. Note that, to begin with, the objectors generally prefer the term 'zygote' to 'conceptus'. What the objections ignore is that 'potentiality' is really part of a way of speaking about what is there, seeing it already as something of profound human significance. Abstracted from its religious-moral context, the 'potentiality argument' can decide nothing.
Implantation
Some dwell on the point at which the fertilized egg (conceptus) implants in the uterine wall. After all, they say, about two-thirds of all zygotes never implant. It is at this point that we have something of moral significance because it is at this point that it becomes 'dependent on the mother', etc. It is hardly surprising that, if we move from the language of embryology to the language of 'dependence on mum', we have already found something 'morally significant'. Others are quick to point out that 'dependence' is 'merely biological'.
Differentiation
At a certain point, the embryo (conceptus, baby?) proceeds beyond an undifferentiated ball of cells; the cells start to group into different shapes and kinds. Many bioethicists are rather excited by this, although excitement is hardly a rational attribute. A committee of experts has decided that, before differentiation, we have a (mere) 'pre-embryo'. The suggestion is that an embryo is somehow evidently better than a pre-embryo. Just like Captain Gulliver's inability to prove that he has seen what the sticks mean, these bioethicists may find themselves at a loss to explain what exactly they see in cell differentiation to those who do not see it. Not that there is anything wrong with seeing it, but what would be wrong is any pretension that this seeing is somehow more rational, scientific or philosophical than not seeing it. One cannot do without some foundation, but it cannot be a rational one. Indeed, if it were rational then it could not serve as a foundation. What is rational is what rests on reasons (i.e. on something else) and so is not a foundation. I was once at a bioethics conference at which a very eminent speaker said that it came to her in a 'flash of inspiration' that cell differentiation was the significant thing; well, precisely.
Ensoulment/quickening
At a rather unpredictable point the fetus begins to move (the baby is kicking around?). ' Lockwood's conclusion is that 'unless the interests of some other being are affected thereby, it is morally permissible to do whatever one likes with a human embryo or fetus before brain development' (pp. 23-24).10 Once there is a brain, there has to be some overriding reason for abortion.
Is it not truly mortifying to think upon all the millions of people who may have needlessly worried about babies in the womb, ignorant of Lockwood's revolutionary insight provided by long study of the bioethical method?
Viability
The ability of the fetus (baby) to survive outside the womb is of the greatest significance for some. The fact that viability varies with the state of technology has only been a minor inconvenience in sustaining this position. Again, we see a rational scheme imposed on things in such a way that common human experience is deemed irrelevant. What mothers, families, relatives, neighbours and nurses feel about the newborn baby is irrelevant emotion; they are gushing over 'a person in the strict sense' who is not there. If only they were rational they would see that in all consistency they should hurry down to the zoo
